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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                                  
 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 In this appeal from a decision of the United States Tax 
Court we are asked to decide if a valuable bass violin can be 
depreciated under the Accelerated Cost Recovery System when used 
as a tool of trade by a professional musician even though the 
instrument actually increased in value while the musician owned 
it. We determine that, under the facts before us, the taxpayer 
properly depreciated the instrument and therefore affirm the 
decision of the Tax Court.  
 
 I. 
 Brian Liddle, the taxpayer here, is a very accomplished 
professional musician.  Since completing his studies in bass 
violin at the Curtis Institute of Music in 1978, he has performed 
with various professional music organizations, including the 
Philadelphia Orchestra, the Baltimore Symphony, the Pennsylvania 
ProMusica and the Performance Organization.  
  In 1984, after a season with the Philadelphia Orchestra, he 
purchased a 17th century bass violin made by Francesco Ruggeri 
(c. 1620-1695), a luthier who was active in Cremona, Italy. 
Ruggeri studied stringed instrument construction under Nicolo 
Amati, who also instructed Antonio Stradivari.  Ruggeri’s other 
contemporaries include the craftsmen Guadanini and Guarneri. 
These artisans were members of a group of instrument makers known 
as the Cremonese School.  
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 Liddle paid $28,000 for the Ruggeri bass, almost as much as 
he earned in 1987 working for the Philadelphia Orchestra.  The 
instrument was then in an excellent state of restoration and had 
no apparent cracks or other damage.  Liddle insured the 
instrument for its then-appraised value of $38,000.  This 
instrument was his principal instrument and he used it 
continuously to earn his living, practicing with it at home as 
much as seven and one-half hours every day, transporting it 
locally and out of town for rehearsals, performances and 
auditions.  Liddle purchased the bass because he believed it 
would serve him throughout his professional career -- anticipated 
to be 30 to 40 years.   
 Despite the anticipated longevity of this instrument, the 
rigors of Liddle's profession soon took their toll upon the bass 
and it began reflecting the normal wear and tear of daily use, 
including nicks, cracks, and accumulations of resin.  At one 
point, the neck of the instrument began to pull away from the 
body, cracking the wood such that it could not be played until it 
was repaired.  Liddle had the instrument repaired by renown 
artisans.  However, the repairs did not restore the instrument's 
"voice" to its previous quality.  At trial, an expert testified 
for Liddle that every bass loses mass from use and from oxidation 
and ultimately loses its tone, and therefore its value as a 
performance instrument decreases.  Moreover, as common sense 
would suggest, basses are more likely to become damaged when used 
as performance instruments than when displayed in a museum. 
Accordingly, professional musicians who use valuable instruments 
as their performance instruments are exposed to financial risks 
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that do not threaten collectors who regard such instruments as 
works of art, and treat them accordingly. 
 There is a flourishing market among nonmusicians for 
Cremonese School instruments such as Mr. Liddle's bass.  Many 
collectors seek primarily the "label", i.e., the maker's name on 
the instrument as verified by the certificate of authenticity. As 
nonplayers, they do not concern themselves with the physical 
condition of the instrument; they have their eye only on the 
market value of the instrument as a collectible.  As the quantity 
of these instruments has declined through loss or destruction 
over the years, the value of the remaining instruments as 
collectibles has experienced a corresponding increase. 
 Eventually, Liddle felt the wear and tear had so 
deteriorated the tonal quality of his Ruggeri bass that he could 
no longer use it as a performance instrument.  Rather than 
selling it, however, he traded it for a Domenico Busan 18th 
century bass in May of 1991.  The Busan bass was appraised at 
$65,000 on the date of the exchange, but Liddle acquired it not 
for its superior value, but because of the greater tonal quality. 
 Liddle and his wife filed a joint tax return for 1987, and 
claimed a depreciation deduction of $3,170 for the Ruggeri bass 
under the Accelerated Cost Recovery System ("ACRS"), I.R.C. 
§168.1  The Commissioner disallowed the deduction asserting that 
the "Ruggeri bass in fact will appreciate in value and not 
                                                           
1
     Because the bass viol was placed in service in 1984, the 
Internal Revenue Code applicable to that year governs this case. 
Thus, our analysis is governed by I.R.C. § 168 as it existed 
prior to 1987. 
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depreciate."  Accordingly, the Commissioner assessed a deficiency 
of $602 for the tax year 1987.  The Liddles then filed a petition 
with the Tax Court challenging the Commissioner's assertion of 
the deficiency.  A closely divided court entered a decision in 
favor of the Liddles. 103 T.C. 285 (1994).  This appeal 
followed.2  
 
II. 
 The Commissioner originally argued that the ACRS deduction 
under § 168 is inappropriate here because the bass actually 
appreciated in value.  However, the Commissioner has apparently 
abandoned that theory, presumably because an asset can appreciate 
in market value and still be subject to a depreciation deduction 
under tax law.  Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 
272, 277 (1966) ("tax law has long recognized the accounting 
concept that depreciation is a process of estimated allocation 
which does not take account of fluctuations in valuation through 
market appreciation."); Noyce v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 670 (1991) 
(taxpayer allowed to deduct depreciation under § 168 on an 
airplane that appreciated in economic value by 27 percent from 
the date of purchase to the time of trial). 
                                                           
2
     Our review of the Tax Court's conclusions of law is 
plenary; however, we review the court's factual findings under a 
clearly erroneous standard.  Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 974 F.2d 422, 430 (3d Cir. 1992); National Starch 
and Chemical Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 432 (3d Cir. 
1990), aff'd, 503 U.S. 79 (1992). 
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 Here, the Commissioner argues that the Liddles can claim the 
ACRS deduction only if they can establish that the bass has a 
determinable useful life.  Since Mr. Liddle's bass is already 
over 300 years old, and still increasing in value, the 
Commissioner asserts that the Liddles can not establish a 
determinable useful life and therefore can not take a 
depreciation deduction.  In addition, the Commissioner argues 
that this instrument is a "work of art" which has an 
indeterminable useful life and is therefore not depreciable. 
 In United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295 (1927), the Supreme 
Court explained the depreciation deduction as follows: 
The depreciation charge permitted as a 
deduction from the gross income in 
determining the taxable income of a business 
for any year represents the reduction, during 
the year, of the capital assets through wear 
and tear of the plant used.  The amount of 
the allowance for depreciation is the sum 
which should be set aside for the taxable 
year, in order that, at the end of the useful 
life of the plant in the business, the 
aggregate of the sums set aside will (with 
the salvage value) suffice to provide an 
amount equal to the original cost. 
 
274 U.S. at 300-301.  Prior to 1981, Section 167 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 167, governed the allowance of 
depreciation deductions with respect to tangible and intangible 
personalty.  Section 167 provided, in relevant part, as follows: 
§ 167. DEPRECIATION 
 
(a) General Rule. -- There shall be allowed 
as a depreciation deduction a reasonable 
allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear 
(including a reasonable allowance for 
obsolescence) -- 
 
(1) of property used in the trade 
or business, or 
 
(2) of property held for the 
production of income. 
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26 U.S.C. § 167(a).  The regulations promulgated under § 167 
provided that in order to qualify for the depreciation deduction, 
the taxpayer had to establish that the property in question had a 
determinable useful life.  Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a) and (b).  The 
useful life of an asset was not necessarily the useful life 
“inherent in the asset but [was] the period over which the asset 
may reasonably be expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his 
trade or business. . . .”  Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b).  Nonetheless, 
under § 167 and its attendant regulations, a determinable useful 
life was the sine qua non for claiming the deduction.  See, 
Harrah’s Club v. United States, 661 F.2d 203, 207 (Ct. Cl. 1981) 
(“Under the regulation on depreciation, a useful life capable of 
being estimated is indispensable for the institution of a system 
of depreciation.”) 
 Under § 167, the principal method for determining the useful 
life of personalty was the Asset Depreciation Range (“ADR”) 
system.  Personalty eligible for the ADR system was grouped into 
more than 100 classes and a guideline life for each class was 
determined by the Treasury Department.  See, Treas. Reg. 
§1.167(a)-11.  A taxpayer could claim a useful life up to 20 
percent longer or shorter than the ADR guideline life.  Treas. 
Reg. § 1.167(4)(b).  The ADR system was optional with the 
taxpayer.  Tres. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(a).  For personalty which was 
not eligible for ADR, and for taxpayers who did not choose to use 
ADR, the useful life of an asset was determined according to the 
unique circumstances of the particular asset or by an agreement 
between the taxpayer and the Internal Revenue Service. STAFF OF THE 
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX 
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ACT OF 1981, 97th Cong., reprinted in INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS, 1980-
1981, at 1441 (1982). 
 In 1981, convinced that tax reductions were needed to ensure 
the continued economic growth of the country, Congress passed the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, P.L. 97-34 (“ERTA”). Id. at 
1391.  It was hoped that the ERTA tax reduction program would 
“help upgrade the nation’s industrial base, stimulate 
productivity and innovation throughout the economy, lower 
personal tax burdens and restrain the growth of the Federal 
Government.”  Id.  Congress felt that prior law and rules 
governing depreciation deductions need to be replaced “because 
they did not provide the investment stimulus that was felt to be 
essential for economic expansion.”  Id. at 1449.  Further, 
Congress believed that the true value of the depreciation 
deduction had declined over the years because of high inflation 
rates.  Id.  As a result, Congress believed that a “substantial 
restructuring” of the depreciation rules would stimulate capital 
formation, increase productivity and improve the country’s 
competitiveness in international trade. Id.  Congress also felt 
that the prior rules concerning the determination of a useful 
life were “too complex”, “inherently uncertain” and engendered 
“unproductive disagreements between taxpayers and the Internal 
Revenue Service.”  Id.   To remedy the situation, Congress 
decided  
that a new capital cost recovery system 
should be structured which de-emphasizes the 
concept of useful life, minimizes the number 
of elections and exceptions and is easier to 
comply with and to administer. 
 
Id.   
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 Accordingly, Congress adopted the Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System (“ACRS”) in ERTA.  The entire cost or other basis of 
eligible property is recovered under ACRS, eliminating the 
salvage value limitation of prior depreciation law. GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 at 1450.  ACRS was 
codified in I.R.C. § 168, which provided, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
§ 168.  Accelerated cost recovery system 
 
(a) Allowance of Deduction. -- There shall be 
allowed as a deduction for any taxable year 
the amount determined under this section with 
respect to recovery property. 
 
(b) Amount of Deduction. -- 
 
(1) In general.-- Except as otherwise 
provided in this section, the amount of the 
deduction allowable by subsection (a) for any 
taxable year shall be the aggregate amount 
determined by applying to the unadjusted 
basis of recovery property the applicable 
percentage determined in accordance with the 
following table: 
 
   ********************************* 
 
(c) Recovery Property. -- For purposes of 
this title -- 
 
(1) Recovery Property Defined. -- Except as 
provided in subsection (e), the term 
"recovery property" means tangible property 
of a character subject to the allowance for 
depreciation -- 
 
(A) used in a trade or business, or 
 
(B) held for the production of income. 
 
26 U.S.C. § 168.  ACRS is mandatory and applied to “recovery 
property” placed in service after 1980 and before 1987.3 
                                                           
3In the Tax Reform Act of 1986, P. L. 99-514, § 201, Congress 
made substantial changes to I.R.C. § 168.  In particular, 
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 Section 168(c)(2) grouped recovery property into five 
assigned categories: 3-year property, 5-year property, 10-year 
property, 15-year real property and 15-year public utility 
property.  Three year property was defined as § 1245 property4 
with a class life of 4 years or less.  Five year property is all 
§ 1245 property with a class life of more than 4 years.  Ten year 
property is primarily certain public utility property, railroad 
tank cars, coal-utilization property and certain real property 
described in I.R.C. § 1250(c).  Other long-lived public utility 
property is in the 15-year class.  26 U.S.C. § 168(a)(2)(A), (B) 
and (C).  Basically, 3-year property includes certain short-lived 
assets such as automobiles and light-duty trucks, and 5-year 
property included all other tangible personal property that was 
not 3-year property.  Most eligible personal property was in the 
5-year class.  
 The Commissioner argues that ERTA § 168 did not eliminate 
the pre-ERTA § 167 requirement that tangible personalty used in a 
trade or business must also have a determinable useful life in 
order to qualify for the ACRS deduction.  She argues that the 
phrase “of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation" 
demonstrates that the pre-ERTA § 167 requirement for a 
determinable useful life is the threshold criterion for claiming 
the § 168 ACRS deduction.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Congress deleted the “recovery property” concept from the 
statute.   
4§ 1245 property is, inter alia, any personal property which is 
or has been property of a character subject to allowance for 
depreciation provided in § 167.  26 U.S.C. § 1245(3). 
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 Much of the difficulty inherent in this case arises from two 
related problems.  First, Congress left § 167 unmodified when it 
added § 168; second, § 168 contains no standards for determining 
when property is "of a character subject to the allowance for 
depreciation."  In the absence of any express standards, logic 
and common sense would dictate that the phrase must have a 
reference point to some other section of the Internal Revenue 
Code.  Section 167(a) would appear to be that section. As stated 
above, that section provides that "[t]here shall be allowed as a 
depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, 
wear and tear. . . of property used in a trade or business. . . 
."  The Commissioner assumes that all of the depreciation 
regulations promulgated under § 167 must, of necessity, be 
imported into § 168.  That importation would include the 
necessity that a taxpayer demonstrate that the asset have a 
demonstrable useful life, and (the argument continues) satisfy 
the phrase "tangible property of a character subject to the 
allowance for depreciation" in § 168.   
   However, we do not believe that Congress intended the 
wholesale importation of § 167 rules and regulations into § 168. 
Such an interpretation would negate one of the major reasons for 
enacting the Accelerated Cost Recovery System.  Rather, we 
believe that the phrase "of a character subject to the allowance 
for depreciation" refers only to that portion of § 167(a) which 
allows a depreciation deduction for assets which are subject to 
exhaustion and wear and tear.  Clearly, property that is not 
subject to such exhaustion does not depreciate. Thus, we hold 
that “property of a character subject to the allowance for 
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depreciation” refers to property that is subject to exhaustion, 
wear and tear, and obsolescence. However, it does not follow that 
Congress intended to make the ACRS deduction subject to the § 167 
useful life rules, and thereby breathe continued life into a 
regulatory scheme that was bewildering, and fraught with 
problems, and required "substantial restructuring." 
 We previously noted that Congress believed that prior 
depreciation rules and regulations did not provide the investment 
stimulus necessary for economic expansion.  Further, Congress 
believed that the actual value of the depreciation deduction 
declined over the years because of inflationary pressures.  In 
addition, Congress felt that prior depreciation rules governing 
the determination of useful lives were much too complex and 
caused unproductive disagreements between taxpayers and the 
Commissioner.  Thus, Congress passed a statute which "de-
emphasizes the concept of useful life." GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 at 1449.  Accordingly, we decline 
the Commissioner's invitation to interpret § 168 in such a manner 
as to re-emphasize a concept which Congress has sought to "de-
emphasize."  
 The Commissioner argues that de-emphasis of useful life is 
not synonymous with abrogation of useful life.  As a general 
statement, that is true.  However, the position of the 
Commissioner, if accepted, would reintroduce unproductive 
disputes over useful life between taxpayers and the Internal 
Revenue Service.  Indeed, such is the plight of Mr. Liddle.  
 Congress de-emphasized the § 167 useful life rules by 
creating four short periods of time over which taxpayers can 
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depreciate tangible personalty used in their trade or business. 
These statutory “recovery periods. . .are generally unrelated to, 
but shorter than, prior law useful lives.”  GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 at 1450.  The four recovery periods 
are, in effect, the statutorily mandated useful lives of tangible 
personalty used in a trade or business. 
 The recovery periods serve the primary purpose of ERTA. Once 
a taxpayer has recovered the cost of the tangible personalty used 
in a trade or business, i.e., once the taxpayer has written off 
the asset over the short recovery period, his or her basis in 
that asset will be zero and no further ACRS deduction will be 
allowed.  To avail himself or herself of further ACRS deductions, 
the taxpayer will have to purchase a new asset.  Thus, because 
the recovery period is generally shorter that the pre-ERTA useful 
live of the asset, the taxpayer’s purchase of the new asset will 
increase capital formation and new investment and, as a result, 
promote the Congressional objective for continued economic 
expansion.   
 Thus, in order for the Liddles to claim an ACRS deduction, 
they must show that the bass is recovery property as defined in 
I.R.C. § 168(c)(1).  It is not disputed that it is tangible 
personalty which was placed in service after 1980 and that it was 
used in Brian Liddle’s trade or business.  What is disputed is 
whether the bass is “property of a character subject to the 
allowance for depreciation.”  We hold that that phrase means that 
the Liddles must only show that the bass was subject to 
exhaustion and wear and tear.  The Tax Court found as a fact that 
the instrument suffered wear and tear during the year in which 
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the deduction was claimed.  103 T.C. 285, 294 (1994).  That 
finding was not clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, the Liddles are 
entitled to claim the ACRS deduction for the tax year in 
question. 
 Similarly, we are not persuaded by the Commissioner's "work 
of art" theory, although there are similarities between Mr. 
Liddle's valuable bass, and a work of art. The bass, is highly 
prized by collectors; and, ironically, it actually increases in 
value with age much like a rare painting.  Cases that addressed 
the availability for depreciation deductions under § 167 clearly 
establish that works of art and/or collectibles were not 
depreciable because they lacked a determinable useful life.  See, 
Associated Obstetricians and Gynecologists, P.C. v. Commissioner, 
762 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1985) (works of art displayed on wall in 
medical office not depreciable); Hawkins v. Commissioner, 713 
F.2d 347 (8th Cir.) (art displayed in law office not 
depreciable); Harrah's Club v. United States, 661 F.2d 203 (Ct. 
Cl. 1981) (antique automobiles in museum not depreciable).  See 
also, Rev. Rul. 68-232, 1968-1 C.B. 79 ("depreciation of works of 
art generally is not allowable" because '[a] valuable and 
treasured art piece does not have a determinable useful life.'"). 
 We also realize that, in a similar case, a musical 
instrument was held to not qualify for depreciation. See Browning 
v. Commissioner, 890 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1989).  However, 
Browning was decided on the basis of § 167(a) and depreciation 
law as it existed before the enactment of ERTA and §168, and it 
therefore provides little guidance to our inquiry. In addition, 
the taxpayer in Browning failed to meet his burden that the 
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Stradivarius violins in question had only a useful life of 12 
years under the ADR system then in effect.  890 F.2d at 1087.  
Moreover, it appears from the Tax Court opinion that the taxpayer 
may not have been using the instruments in his profession but 
rather was acquiring them as collectibles.  55 T.C.M.(CCH) 1232, 
1237 (1988)(“ [F]rom the record, we have no definite answer as to 
how often the three antique violins were used, if ever. . . . In 
fact, we suspect that petitioner was forming a collection of 
antique violins not only as musical tools of the trade but as 
antique collectibles.”) In Brian Liddle's professional hands, his 
bass viol was a tool of his trade, not a work of art.  It was as 
valuable as the sound it could produce, and not for its looks.  
Normal wear and tear from Liddle's professional demands took a 
toll upon the instrument's tonal quality and he, therefore, had 
every right to avail himself of the depreciation provisions of 
the Internal Revenue Code as provided by Congress.  
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III. 
 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we will affirm 
the decision of the tax court. 
